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Abstract: The great leap famine started with a good harvest in the end of 1958 and ended when the rural grain 
consumption per capita touched the lowest level in 1961. All the hypotheses except for communal dining halls 
could not explain the puzzle. The communal dining system is the most important cause of great leap famine 
since it can explain the whole sequence from the start, aggravation and end of the famine. Basing on the panel 
data from 1958 to 1962 of 25 provinces, and employing the sharp change of the participation rate from 
elementary cooperative in 1954 to advance cooperative in 1956 caused by Mao’s critique on Deng zihui in 
1955 as the IV of the radicalism of communal dining system, we find that communal dining system do have 
greatest partial effect with high significance on the death rate than the other factors. The evidence of the beta 
coefficient and Gfields decomposition also show that communal dining system is the most important cause on 
the famine. 
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
 
More than 55 years has elapsed since the end of the Great Leap Famine (GLF), a greatest disaster in human 
history. It has become clear through scholars’ effort that it is a disaster made mainly not by weather as is still so 
claimed officially in China, but by human mistakes. However, the main causes of the famine are still subject to 
heated debate. As Johnson(1998) states, it is an impossible task to assess the joint and independent impacts of 
the various factors on the famine unless we can get enough data and construct and implement a complicated 
model. In this paper, in the light of new data and facts we revisit the existing hypothesis on the causes of 
famine. In particularly, we aim to highlight the impact of the communal dining by assessing the relative 
importance of various factors on famine 2SLS estimation, beta coefficient and Gfields decomposition. 
The existing hypotheses on the causes of famine, as illustrated in figure 1, focused on the production, 
distribution and consumption of rural grain. First, the hypothesis of food availability decline argues that the 
decline in grain output was caused by natural disaster (“Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of The Party 
since the Founding of PRC”:1981), or by the deprivation of free exit rights from communes (Lin:1990),or by 
the excessive diversion of production resources from agriculture to industry(Li and Yang:2005). Second, the 
hypothesis on urban bias policy focuses on excessive grain procurement from rural areas to feed the urban 
population (Bernstein:1984; Walker:1984; Lin and Yang:2000; ) or the drain caused by the support given to the 
development of local industry sector (Fan, fortcoming). Third, the hypothesis of collective accumulation finds 
that the collectives retained and wasted too much grain in promoting the Great Leap Forward in rural areas, 
resulting in insufficient grain left to feed the local peasants (Liu: 2010).  
Finally, The hypothesis of communal dining focuses on the wastage of this institution and its negative effect 
on peasants’ motivation to work hard (Yang Dali:1996; Chang and Wen:1997,1998). However, Kung and Lin 
(2003) argued that it was the political radicalism such as energy consuming projects in rural areas rather than 
communal dining system that caused the famine, because communal dining system did not function any more 
since food deficiency became popular after the spring 1959. As we will state in this paper, their understanding 
on communal dining system is biased, such consumption model means not only compelling grain 
collectivization, but also deprivation of household plots as well as forbidding of household sideline production. 
Furthermore, communal dining system experiences four stages from start in the spring and winter of 1958, 
retreat in the spring of 1959, recovery and consolidation after Lunshan conference and finally end after June of 
1961, instead of simple pattern of rise and fall. A striking feature of GLF lies in its mysterious nature: it started 
with a good fall harvest in the winter of 1958 when the per capita rural grain consumption was among the 
highest since 1949, and ended when this index reached the lowest level in the second half year of 1961 and 
maintained at a level lower than that of 1959 when the famine was aggravated nationwide (see Fig. 1). All the 
other hypotheses except for communal dining could not explain the puzzle. 
Sichuan, as the biggest grain exporter to the rest of the nation, can serve as a good example in this case. Its 
death rate in 1958 increased by 109% compared with 1957, while its grain possession per capita in rural areas 
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increased from 212.3 kg in 1957 to 235.5 kg in 1958.
4
 The whole country except for Sichuan terminated 
famine in 1961 while the grain consumption per capita
5
 touched the lowest level since 1952, and even lower 
than the standard of 1960 when the famine was worst.  
As we can see, neither the hypothesis of grain output decline, nor the hypotheses of excessive grain 
procurement or high collective accumulation could explain the puzzle of great famine. We try to interpret the 
puzzle by focusing on communal dining system. Our central hypothesis will be illustrated in section Ⅱ. A 
detailed empirical test on the various causes of famine will be presented in section Ⅲ. Section Ⅳ summarizes 
the lessons from the famine. 
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Figure 1: Grain Production, Distribution and Consumption during Great Leap Forward 
 
Figure 2: The Grain Consumption in Rural Areas from 1952 to 1965 
Source: Price Department of State Statistics Bureau, 1984: p.27. 
 
                                                        
4 Rural grain per capita = (grain output - grain procurement + grain resold in rural areas)/ rural year-average population. This 
term is defined in this way unless otherwise specified. The trade grain procurement increased from 4.98 million ton in 1957 to 
5.38 million ton in 1958, increasing by 8 percent. However, the net procurement rate decreased to 24.7% in 1958 from 25.3% in 
1957 because the grain output and grain resold to rural areas rose. See Planning Office of Ministry of Agriculture(1983: p.172, 
p.390). 
5 A standard deducted the grain procurement and collective accumulation from grain output. 
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Ⅱ.HYPOTHESIS 
 
Contrary to the definition on communal dining by Chang and Wen (1997, 1998), the communal dining system 
(CDHs) in this paper represent three logically coherent institutional changes: the compulsory collectivization 
of peasants’ total grain rations, combined with the deprivation of private plots and the abolishment of 
household sideline production. For brevity, we refer this triune as CDHs wherever there is no need to discuss 
them separately.  
Compared with Kung and Lin’s understanding on the rise and fall of CDHs, it actually experienced four 
stages: the establishment in the autumn of 1958, de facto suspension in the spring of 1959 due to food shortage, 
the restoration and consolidation after the Lushan Conference in the summer of 1959, and the abrupt 
dismantlement around June of 1961 nationwide except for Sichuan. As China’s senior economist named Zhang 
Shuguang pointed out, Lushan Conference thus became the turning point of GLF: before the conference many 
CDHs were being dismissed as the central committee of CPC softened some of the radical policies under food 
pressure since early 1959; after the conference most peasants were forced to return to CDHs because the 
participation in CDHs was viewed as an indicator of one’s loyalty to socialism.
6
 
We argue that the CDHs with the triune institutional components is the most significant cause of the GLF. 
Figure 3simulates the sequencing of how the implementation, consolidation, and the dissolution of the CDHs 
triggered, intensified, and ended the famine. The horizontal axis measures time, and the vertical one measures 
three types of daily per capita grain intake: (a) the daily grain intake per capita in 1961, represented by a 
horizontally dotted line and labeled as the minimum subsistence standard, since the whole country came out of 
famine in 1961 when the grain intake reached lowest level; (b) the bona fide daily grain consumption by a 
typical peasant throughout the famine period, represented by a thick dark line; (c) the nominal daily grain 
intake based on the official data and represented by a dashed line. The blank area between the dotted line and 
thick line represents the occurrence of famine, and the dashed line lies most of the time above the dotted 
horizontal line from the winter of 1958 to the middle of 1961, indicating that the famine would not have 
happened without CDHs. The detailed mechanism of CDHs on famine is illustrated as following. 
 
                                                        
6Zhang Shuguang,YigeWutuobang de Xingshuai: ZhongguoShekeyuanJingjiYanjiusuoLiushinianLishi (The Rise and Fall of A 
Communist Utopia: Communal Dining halls and The Report on it,  Sixty-year History of Institute of Economics of Chinese 
Academy of  Social Sciences), Vol.1, fortcoming. 
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Figure 3: The Mechanism of Communal Dining on Famine 
 
First, the tremendous wastage of communal dining halls triggered the famine in some provinces in the winter 
of 1958 and more regions in the spring of 1959. As Walter (1926) said, China was known as a land of famine 
for centuries. In normal years the grain was just enough for peasants in most regions to muddle through until 
the next harvest on a level slightly above the minimum subsistence standard. The free food system 
implemented in the autumn and winter of 1958 by CDHs blew away all the disciplines in food consumption, 
and the only limiting factor was the size of one’s stomach. Peng Dehuai(1981), in his famous letter to Mao 
during Lushan Conference, pointed out a fact that in some rural areas the quantity of grain consumed by 
peasants in three months amounted to what usually sufficed for six months. Some dining halls even exhausted 
three-month grain ration within only half a month (Zhao,1988:p.109). According to the estimation of Xue 
Muqiao(1984:p.90;1996:p.265) who was in charge of the state statistics bureau and planning committee at that 
time, the overconsumption of grain in rural China in the first year of the commune movement (1958)amounted 
to about 17.5 million tons, equivalent to 11 per cent of the total grain supply for the rural population.
7
 It is 
clear that CDHs led to considerable food wastage, which would inevitably result in food shortage between two 
harvests and hereafter a famine in some provinces, especially in those acted more radically in communal 
                                                        
7 The grain supply for rural population in 1958 amounted to 158.3 million tons. See Chang andWen(1997: p.33, note 76). 
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dining system. 
However, the famine was not so severe in its early stages and many areas were abandoning CDHs by the 
spring of 1959. Unfortunately, CDHs was revived after Lushan Conference, which bring two consequences. 
On the one hand, the equalitarian distribution in communal dining halls, which constituted most of peasants’ 
income, discouraged greatly peasants’ initiative to work hard and the grain output decline further. The sharp 
decline of agricultural productivity in commune was evidenced by Hu Qiaomu’s report to Mao after his 
investigation on Shaoshan commune of Hunan province on April 1961.
8
 On the other hand, corruption among 
rural cadres and their abuse of power became popular and fatal for common peasants as the food shortage 
developed. Consequently, peasants’ real consumption became not only lower than nominal, but also less than 
the minimum subsistence standard. This made the famine greatly exacerbated through demoralizing peasants 
in their food production. The other two characteristics of the dining system, i.e., the prohibition of private plots 
and household sideline production completely cut off channels for self relief through self-production. 
Moreover, the traditional mechanism in rural China of running away from famine-stricken areas became 
difficult under the tight control of grain by CDHs. All these evil consequences of CDHs intensified the famine 
by further cutting down the real food consumption.  
Some provinces such as Anhui had dismissed communal dining halls early in the spring of 1961, while the 
whole country was allowed to dismiss CDHs in the middle of 1961, so peasants regained their grain rations 
and were again permitted to prepare and consume their grain rations at home. Accordingly, efficiency in food 
consumption increased sharply with the recovery of family kitchen. Furthermore, the recovery of private plots 
and household sideline production timely provided peasants with supplementary food to collective grain 
distribution. The dissolution of CDHs raised the peasants’ real consumption to a level that was at least not 
lower than the minimum subsistence standard. This explains how the famine could have ended in rural China 
just as rural grain consumption per capita hit its lowest level since 1958, when logically, one should have 
expected further deterioration of the famine. It is worthy to note that, Sichuan did not dismiss communal 
dining halls until 1962, and its death rate was still higher than that of 1957.  
In summary, without taking CDHs into consideration, we can neither understand why the great famine broke 
out when rural grain consumption per capita was at its highest level, nor can we explain why the great famine 
ended abruptly when rural grain consumption per capita fell to its lowest level since the early 1950s. Our 
central hypothesis is that communal dining system is the most important cause of great famine. 
 
Ⅲ.  A Test on the Causality between CDHs and Famine 
 
As stated above, the rights lost and regained by Chinese peasants to exit from communal dining played an 
important role in triggering, intensifying and ending the Chinese great famine. In what follows, we present an 
                                                        
8 JianguoYilaiZhongyaoWenxianXuanbian (Selection of Important Literatures Since the Foundation of New China) (Volume 
14), ZhongyangWenxianChubanshe, 1997, p.303. 
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empirical study using a panel data of 25 provinces from 1958 to 1962 to further testify the effects of various 
factors, especially the communal dining system on the famine. 
 
A. Data and Model 
As Figure 4 shows, the deaths during the famine mainly occurred among rural population, and the excessive 
death rate of the rural population mainly depended on the following factors: food availability per capita after 
procurement and rural resale, grain procurement, collective accumulation, political radicalism in forms of 
energy consuming projects, communal dining system. Focusing the role of communal dining on famine, we 
depict the relationship of the participation rate of communal dining halls (prcd) and the cumulative excessive 
death rate from 1958 to 1961(cedr)
9
 in figure 5, using the data of Chang and Wen(1997: 1997:pp.24-26). It 
indicates that those provinces with higher participation rate of communal dining halls suffered graver 
mortality rate.  
In order test the causality of various factors on famine, we construct the following estimation model: 
0 1ln ln
j
it i it i itdr cdh X                   (1) 
where i indexes each  province, t indexes each  year, dr stands for the death rate, cdh means the 
participation rate of communal dining hall in the end of 1959. X include various controlled variables such as 
grain available to peasants after procurement and rural resale(g), net grain procurement(netpr), collective 
accumulation (cip), energy consumption projects (hip). The first three variables were used in previous 
empirical studies, but the hip need more interpretation since it did not appear in Kung and Lin(2003)’s 
estimation. 
 
Figure 4: The Death Rates in Rural Areas and Urban Areas in China form 1954 to 1966 (in ‰) 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, 1990: p.80. 
                                                        
9 According to Chang and Wen(1997), cumulative excessive death rate is calculated as to the following equation: 
 55 57tdeathreate deathrate  , in which t is represented by year of 1958, 1959,1960 and 1961. 
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Figure 5: Relationship between participation rate of communal dining and cumulative excessive death rate. 
Source: Chang and Wen,1997:pp.24-26 
 
 High energy consuming projects during The Great Leap Forward included massive irrigation projects, and 
steel & iron production, but the data on provincial irrigation areas and steel output is incomplete. The Great 
Leap Forward was essentially a mass movement to carry out the so-called catching-up strategy by giving 
priority to the development of heavy industry, with steel production as its core.
10
 The increased emphasis on 
steel and iron production during The Great Leap Forward would certainly increase the percentage of the 
output of heavy industry to the gross output of industry and agriculture. Hence, we use this percentage, hip, as 
a proxy for political radicalism in form of high energy consuming projects. As Figure 5 reveals, steel 
production and the hip had the same trends at the national level. Especially during The Great Leap Forward, 
both variables increased rapidly throughout 1958, hit their maximum values in 1960 and began to decline in 
1961. It can be inferred that the above defined percentage reveals the political radicalism in the form of high 
energy consuming projects. 
                                                        
10 For example, the slogan at that time was “taking steel production as the central task”. Se Bo(1997, p.679). 
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Figure 6: Heavy Industry and Steel Output 
Source: General Office of State Statistics Bureau, 1990: p.10, p.18. 
 
One potential problem in equation (1) is that the variable cdh is endogenous, that is Cov(lncdh, uit)≠0, so the 
estimator of 1  is biased. The endogeneity of chd arise from three ways: measurement error, reverse 
causality and omitted variables biases. (a) The participation rate of communal dining halls in the end of 1959 
can reflect the radicalism of various provinces in some degree, but such rate may have measure error since 
those regions acting more radically would overstate the participation rate. (b) As we quoted above, the 
participation rate of communal dining halls in the national level decreased from 90 percent in 1958 to 72.6 
percent in 1959. Some provinces may retreat in the communal dining system in some degree to mitigate the 
hunger, especially in those provinces with extremely high death rate such as Anhui. In other words, dr may 
react to cdh in some provinces. (c) Since cdh represents political radicalism, some other factors that 
correlative with political radicalism are probably unobserved and omitted in the model. 
 The estimation by the Instrumented Variable (IV) can obtain the unbiased estimator of 
1
 . Suppose the IV 
as Z, it must satisfied two conditions: Cov(Z,lncdh)≠0 and Cov(Z, uit)=0. We will examine the history of 
collectivization movement in rural China to find the proper IV for communal dining system.   
As table 1 shown, the collectivization movement in China during 1950s experienced four stages including 
mutual-aid team, elementary cooperatives, advanced cooperatives and people’s commune with increasing 
scales. As figure 7 illustrated, the collectivization movement in China is characterized by a recycle of “rash 
advance-opposition to rash advance-anti-opposition to rash advance”(冒进-反冒进-反反冒进). First rash 
advance appeared in some regions from the winter of 1952 to the spring of 1953, then the Rural Work 
Department of CPC issued the policy on mutual-aid production as “advance steadily” in the first National 
Conference on rural work in April of 1953, then the rash advance was rectified during 1953-1954. However, 
Chairman Mao did not agreed with the rectification work in the spring of 1953, and talked two times with the 
leaders of the Rural Work Department in October and November 1953. He criticized that the rectification blew 
down some agricultural production cooperatives that should not blow down. Then the elementary cooperatives 
were practiced from experiment to generalization and developed rapidly throughout the country before Mao 
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retreated to some extent on collectivization after he received some reports on the instability in rural areas due 
to rapid cooperation and excessive grain procurement in the spring of 1955. 
However, Mao was inspired by new reports on grain procurement which revealed that the grain deficiency 
in rural areas was not true and his two inspects in southern areas in April and May of 1955, his attitude to the 
development speed of agriculture cooperation reversed totally in May 1955. Mao and Deng Zihui (the head of 
the Rural Work Department of CCCPC) disputed on the target on the development of agriculture cooperative 
in June 1955. Mao suggested that the cooperatives should be doubled from 650000 in the spring planting of 
1955 to 1300000 before the autumn harvest of 1956. By contrast, Deng Zihui insisted that it should keep pace 
with the plan of the 3
rd
 National Conference of rural Work, and it was very difficult to consolidate the planned 
1000000 cooperatives.  
Mao regarded the rightist represented by Deng zihui as a great hinder to accelerate the progress of 
agriculture cooperation. Mao made an important speech entitled with On the Problem of Agriculture 
Cooperation on the conference of the Secretary of a provincial-level Party Committee in July 1955, and 
severely criticized Deng Zihui as a woman with bound feet for his rightist mistake in agriculture cooperation. 
On this important conference, Mao declared that the tide of agriculture cooperation is coming in the whole 
country, and requested all the cadres should push rather than hinder the cooperative movement. Mao revised 
his speech and sent it as “A Notice from Central Committee” to all level Party organizations and all Party 
members from provincial committees to rural branches in August 26
th
 1955, the revised edition was published 
in People’s Daily in October 17
th
 1955. The cadres in all level made self-examination and criticized the rightist 
mistake in the previous work on agriculture movement. The Resolution on the Problem of Agriculture 
Cooperation was passed in the seventh session of the sixth plenary session of the CPC in October 1955, and it 
became the turning point of agriculture cooperation movement in rural China, the whole country was inspired 
by Mao to accelerate the progress of cooperation sharply, with the percentage of advance cooperation rose 
from 0.033% in 1955 to 62.6% in 1956. The target of socialist transformation that planned to be done within 
eighteen years had been accomplished eleven years ahead of schedule in the end of 1956. 
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Figure 7: Collectivization Movement in Rural China during 1950s  
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Table 1: Collectivization Movement in Rural China from 1950 to 1958 
Year  
Mutual-aid group Elementary agriculture cooperative Advance agriculture cooperative People’s commune 
Number Scale Percentage Number Scale Percentage Number Scale Percentage Number Scale Percentage 
1950 2724000 4.2 10.91 18 10.4 0.0002 1 32 0.00003 
   
1951 4675000 4.5 17.54 129 12.3 0.0015 1 30 0.00003 
   
1952 8026000 5.7 39.86 4000 15.7 0.05 10 184 0.002 
   
1953 7450000 6.1 39.23 15000 18.1 0.235 150 137 0.002 
   
1954 9931000 6.9 58.37 114000 20 1.948 200 58.6 0.01 
   
1955 7147000 8.4 50.66 633000 26.7 14.162 500 75.8 0.033 
   
1956 850000 12.2 8.75 216000 48.2 29.1 540000 199 62.60 
   
1957 
   
36000 44.5 4.47 753000 159 69.60 
   
1958 
         
24000 5000 99 
Source: Shi(1959, pp.992-999); Lin(1990,p.1232).
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As a matter of fact, the recycle of rash advance and anti-rash advance not only appeared in the 
early stage of cooperation, but also happened during Great Leap Forward. As stated above, 
almost all the peasants were pushed to commune and 90.6 percent peasants took part in 
communal dining halls in the autumn of 1958, the famine in some regions in the winter of 1958 
and the spring of 1959 forced the Central Committee to take measures to anti rash advance, the 
communal dining halls were dismissed in some regions, and the policy of great leap forward was 
retreated in some degree. However, the situation reversed totally as Mao criticized Peng Dehuai’s 
rightist mistake on attacking the Great Leap Forward in the “Ten Thousand Words Letter” in 
Lushan Conference. Communal dining system was regarded as the battle between socialism and 
capitalism again. Consequently, the dismissed communal dining halls were recovered and even 
consolidated in some regions. 
We argue that the anti-rightist movement in 1955 and 1959 both launched by Mao were quite 
similar and highly correlative. The cadres in all levels acted more radically in agriculture 
cooperation after Deng Zihui was criticized by Mao. According to political institution with Mao 
as the most authoritative leader in China, the same logic will run when a new anti-rightist 
movement was launched again in all regions after Mao criticized Peng Dehuai in Lushan 
Conference. Especially, the history experience from 1954 to1956 in agriculture cooperation was 
imbed in the memory of the cadres in all levels, those regions acted more radically in agriculture 
cooperation would do the same things after Lushan Conference.  
That is to say, the radicalism in agriculture cooperation in 1956 is high correlative with the 
radicalism in communal dining in Great Leap Forward due to history memory, while it would not 
have direct impact on famine. We employ the ratio of the participation rate of elementary 
cooperative in 1954 to participation rate of advance cooperative in 1956 (adcelc) to measure the 
radicalism of agriculture cooperation. More radically the regions acted, higher the adcelc is: 
taking the participation rate of elementary cooperative as constant, those regions with higher 
participation rate of advance cooperative acted more radically. The adcelc may be a proper 
instrumented variable of communal dining system as it satisfied the above two conditions: (1) 
adcelc is correlative with cdh;(2) adcelc has no partial effect on the death rate in famine. We will 
demonstrate these two conditions in the following. 
Another proper IV for communal dining system is the population density in rural areas. The 
willingness of peasants to join communal dining halls is affected by the population density in 
rural areas. In those regions with rich land and few people, peasants lived dispersedly in rural 
areas. Therefore, it is difficult for peasants to dine together in communal dining halls. By 
contrary, it is relatively easier to build the communal dining halls in those regions where peasants 
live closely. For instance, in the sparsely populated northeast provinces, there were only 23 
percent, 29.4 percent and 26.5 percent peasants took part in communal dining halls for Liaoning, 
Jilin and Heilongjiang province respectively in 1959, even quite lower than the counterpart (61 
percent) of densely populated Jiangxi province. Therefore, population density in rural areas is 
closely correlative with the participation rate of communal dining halls. Here we employ the 
cultivated land per capita in rural areas (landpc) to measure the land entitlement. One thing that 
must be pointed out is that landpc may affect the death rate through such mechanisms as grain 
output and procurement other than communal dining halls. Fortunately, we can control the above 
factors in the model easily.    
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Table 2: the participation rate in cooperative in different stage 
province 
Communal dining halls 
in 1959 
Advance cooperative  
in 1956 
Elementary cooperative  
in 1954 
Hebei 74.4 99.4 7.35 
Shanxi 70.6 97.9 9.54 
Inner Mongolia 16.7 77.5 20.20 
Liaoning 23 91.8 3.89 
Jilin 29.4 95.7 5.21 
Heilongjiang 26.5 98.7 7.14 
Jiangsu 56 78.9 1.47 
Zhejiang 81.6 60 1.84 
Anhui 90.5 80.7 1.57 
Fujian 67.2 62.2 1.59 
Jiangxi 61 62.2 0.32 
Shandong 35.5 67.2 3.45 
Henan 97.8 97.2 1.50 
Hubei 68.2 69 0.30 
Hunan 97.6 13.8 0.08 
Guangdong 77.6 44.1 0.36 
Guangxi 81 62.2 0.27 
Sichuan 96.7 7.4 0.18 
Guizhou 92.6 27.9 0.20 
Yunnan 96.5 51.6 0.42 
Shananxi 60.8 65.2 0.50 
Gansu 47.7 34.5 1.02 
Qinghai 29.9 9.2 0.29 
Ningxia 52.9 N.A N.A 
Xinjiang 85.1 42.1 0.14 
Nation Mean 72.6 62.6 2.87 
 
  
 
Table 3: the meaning of variables 
variable description  
unit of 
measurement 
dr death rate one in a thousand 
cdh participation rate of communal dining hall  percentage  
g grain available to peasants after procurement and rural resale kg per capita per 
year 
netpr ratio of grain procurement minus rural resale to grain output percentage  
ruralp ration of rural population to total population percentage  
cip output of collective industries in the constant price of 1957 million yuan 
hip percentage of the output of heavy industry to total output of 
industry and agriculture 
percentage  
landpc cultivated land per agriculture population  (1957) mu per capita 
adcelc ratio of the participation rate of elementary cooperatives in percentage  
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1954to participation rate of advanced cooperatives in 1956 
 
Table 4: Statistics Description of Variables 
variable obs mean std. dev. min max 
dr 125 15.239 9.762 5.350 68.580 
cdh 125 64.672 25.624 16.700 97.800 
g 125 203.589 52.017 123.950 419.791 
netpr 125 23.125 10.334 5.383 59.599 
ruralp 125 80.797 9.413 35.875 92.530 
cip 125 472.787 380.049 5.520 1771.000 
hip 125 33.095 14.615 10.635 73.885 
landpc 125 3.890 2.965 1.324 12.479 
adcelc 120 87.487 84.152 3.836 307.299 
 
B. Benchmark Regression 
  
We first use OLS to test the effect of communal dining halls on the famine. If only considering 
the single variable of lnchd in the model (1), we find that communal dining system did 
significantly raise the death rate. The participation rate grows by 10%, the death rate will 
increase by 2.43%. When more factors such as lng, one year-lagged lnnetpr, lnruralp, lncip, and 
lnhip are controlled from model (2) to model (5) respectively, the parameter of communal dining 
system ranges from 0.198 to 0.354, and is still statistically significant. It indicated that given 
other conditions are constant, 10% growth in the participation rate in communal dining halls will 
lead to 1.98% to 3.54% increase in death rate.  
 The other variables have the predicted parameters as the existed hypotheses. The parameter of 
lng is significantly negative, which means that the increase of grain available for peasants after 
procurement and rural resale would be helpful to alleviate the famine: 10% increase in grain 
availability would lead to a reduction in death rate by at least 5.04%. Meanwhile, the rise of one 
year-lagged net grain procurement ratio will greatly worsen the famine: the ratio of net grain 
procurement was raised by 10%, then the death rate will rise by 3.62% to 3.96%. Since the ratio 
of net grain procurement has covered the effect of urbanization of rural population during great 
leap forward, it is rational that the effect of lnruralp is not significant. As Liu(2010) argued, the 
collective accumulation was raised sharply during great leap forward, such change will inevitably 
lower the grain consumption for ordinary peasants and made the famine worsen. The parameter 
of lncip, a proxy for collective accumulation, is positive but insignificant in statistics. It is 
because that the increase in collective accumulation appeared in 1958 and 1959, not in the whole 
period of great leap forward. Finally, the energy consuming activities, indicated by lnhip, also has 
positive effect on death rate: the percentage of the output of heavy industry to the gross output of 
agriculture and industry increase by 10%, the death rate will rise by 1.93%. 
To test the dynamic effect of communal dining system on famine, taking year 1962 as the 
benchmark period model (6) incorporates four interaction terms of lncdh and year dummies. We 
find that the coefficient of lncdh is still positive though its magnitude decreases in some degree. 
Contrast to the situation in 1962, communal dining system caused extra death by 7.6%, 10%, 
16.6% 4.9% from 1958 to 1961 respectively. It reveals that the effect of communal dining halls 
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on famine is most serious in 1960, and less in 1961, moderate in 1958 and 1959, such change is 
consistent with the theoretical perception described in figure 3 and empirical dynamics depicted 
in figure 4. 
 
Table 5: The Estimation of OLS 
Variables 
lndr 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lncdh 0.243*** 0.198*** 0.354*** 0.346*** 0.353*** 0.175 
 (0.082) (0.069) (0.103) (0.096) (0.103) (0.103) 
lng  -0.528** -0.683*** -0.663*** -0.573** -0.504* 
  (0.207) (0.228) (0.232) (0.240) (0.280) 
lnnetpr-1   0.388*** 0.396*** 0.362*** 0.167 
   (0.122) (0.119) (0.119) (0.128) 
lnruralp   -0.298 -0.240 0.077 -0.027 
   (0.250) (0.261) (0.295) (0.237) 
lnCIP    0.033 0.042 0.007 
    (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) 
lnhip     0.193* -0.016 
     (0.107) (0.091) 
lncdh*58      0.076*** 
      (0.017) 
lncdh*59      0.100*** 
      (0.012) 
lncdh*60      0.166*** 
      (0.034) 
lncdh*61      0.049*** 
      (0.015) 
Constant 1.615*** 4.591*** 4.886** 4.344** 1.849 3.851* 
 (0.309) (1.131) (1.819) (1.973) (2.318) (2.107) 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.077 0.156 0.287 0.296 0.321 0.496 
Standard errors in parentheses,
*
p< 0.10, 
**
p< 0.05, 
***
p< 0.01 
 
C. IV Estimation 
As stated above, the key variable of cdh may be endogenous for reverse causality, omitted variables 
and measure error. In this subsection, we will reexamine the causality of communal dining system and 
famine by instrumented variables. 
Model (7)-(9) presents the estimation of two-stage OLS. In the first stage estimation, we find that 
those regions acted more radically during agriculture cooperation from 1954 to 1956 do play more 
radically in communal dining system. 10 percentage points rise in adcelc will lead to 3% increased in 
the participation rate of communal dining halls. Meanwhile, those provinces with low population 
density did play less radically in communal dining halls: 10% increase of the cultivated land per 
capita in rural areas will lead to 4.68% decrease of the participation rate of communal dining hall. 
When both adcelc and lnlandpc are taken as the instrumented variables for lncdh in model (9), both 
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instrumented variables have the same significant effect on lncdh as model (7) and (8) with coefficients 
fall slightly. All the estimations by 2SLS show that the variable of lncdh is endogenous
11
 and the 
instrumented variables are highly correlative with lncdh. The Sargan test in model (9) shows that both 
the IVs are valid: both adcelc and lnlandpc are correlative with lncdh but have no partial effect on 
death rate.  
 In order to test the validity of IV while single IV was used in model of (7) and (8), we make use of 
the approach initiated by Acemoglu etc.(2001). The basic idea is that, the IV may significantly 
influence the dependent variable while excluding the endogenous variable in regression, but the role 
of IV becomes insignificantly once the endogenous variable is included in regression. It indicates that 
the IV does affect dependent only through the channel represented by endogenous variable. The 
results can be found in table 7. We can see that both adcelc and lnlandpc have the expected significant 
effect on lndr while lncdh is excluded in the regression in model (10) and (11) respectively, but the 
effect of both IVs become insignificant when lncdh is simultaneously included in the model (12) and 
(13) respectively. The evidences show that either adcelc or lnlandpc is valid since each of them does 
not have partial effect on death rate when lncdh is controlled.  
As we state above, the problem of reverse causality and omitted variables will result in an 
overestimation of the parameter, and the measurement error will tend to underestimate the coefficient. 
The estimation by instrumented variables resolves the endogenous problem of lncdh caused by the 
above three ways, so the estimated coefficients by two stages OLS is consistent and unbiased. It can 
be seen that the coefficients of lncdh by two stages OLS is highly statistically significant with 1% 
level, and range from 0.599 to 0.618. It means that the participation rate of communal dining halls 
raised by 10 percent, the death rate will increase about 6 percent, which is much larger than the 
estimation by OLS. This suggests that measurement error in the communal dining variables that 
creates attenuation bias is likely to be more important than reverse causality and omitted variables 
biases.  
Table 6: The estimation of IV  
lndr 
(7) (8) (9) 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
First stage lncdh lncdh Lncdh 
adcelc 0.003
***
  0.002
***
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
lnlandpc  -0.468
***
 -0.413
***
 
  (0.061) (0.057) 
Second stage Lndr Lndr Lndr 
lncdh 0.618
***
 0.599
***
 0.616
***
 
 (0.159) (0.139) (0.116) 
lng -0.615
***
 -0.603
***
 -0.615
***
 
 (0.172) (0.168) (0.171) 
lnnetpr_1 0.403
***
 0.421
***
 0.403
***
 
 (0.105) (0.099) (0.102) 
lnruralp -0.341 -0.302 -0.338 
 (0.435) (0.413) (0.402) 
                                                        
11 The p value of endogeneity tests in model (7)-(9) is 13.6%, 12.4% and 0.3% respectively, it indicates that the 
endogeneity of lncdh becomes more significant when two IVs is simultaneously included in the regression.     
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lnCIP 0.043 0.036 0.043 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) 
lnhip 0.237
**
 0.205
**
 0.236
**
 
 (0.102) (0.095) (0.102) 
cons 2.543 2.479 2.539 
 (2.477) (2.416) (2.460) 
N 120 125 120 
R
2
 0.262 0.265 0.262 
Endogeneity Tests 
2.384 
[0.136] 
2.532 
[0.124] 
10.633 
[0.003] 
Weak IV Test 40.768 
[0.000] 
58.567 
[0.000] 
55.651 
[0.000] 
Sargan Test 
 
  0.000 
(0.987) 
 
 
Table 7: Validity Test of the IV   
Variables 
lndr 
(10) (11) (12) (13) 
lncdh   0.261* 0.231** 
   (0.137) (0.103) 
adcelc 0.002***  0.001  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
lnlandpc  -0.280**  -0.172 
  (0.106)  (0.108) 
lng -0.769*** -0.538** -0.704** -0.563** 
 (0.230) (0.197) (0.252) (0.219) 
Llnnetpr 0.305** 0.448*** 0.346*** 0.437*** 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.120) (0.122) 
lnruralp 0.481 0.214 0.134 0.015 
 (0.406) (0.256) (0.327) (0.265) 
lnCIP 0.081** 0.019 0.065 0.026 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) 
lnhip 0.276*** 0.161 0.259** 0.178 
 (0.080) (0.125) (0.096) (0.121) 
Constant 2.051 2.787 2.258 2.668 
 (2.464) (1.713) (2.517) (2.084) 
Observations 120 125 120 125 
R-squared 0.302 0.315 0.348 0.348 
 
The relative importance of the various causes of the famine 
According to the estimation, the causes of Great Leap Famine include the communal dining system, 
grain availability decline, excessive grain procurement and high energy consuming projects. The 
estimated coefficients by OLS and two stages OLS only reveal the marginal effect of various factors 
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on famine, it is necessary to calculate the sum effect to compare the role of different factors on 
famine. 
We first estimate the beta coefficient of various variables according to model (4), (6)-(8), and the 
results are reported in table 7. It can be read in the second column of table 7 that one standard 
deviation change in lncdh, lng, Llnnetpr and lnhip will cause 0.401, 0.310, 0.343 and 0.191 standard 
deviation rise in lndr respectively, which shows that communal dining system does cause more death 
loss than the other radical policies. The estimation by two stages of OLS also indicates that the beta 
coefficients of lncdh rise from 0.401 in model (4) to 0.491, 0.495 and 0.567 in model (6)-(8) 
respectively. It shows that the effects of communal dining system on famine as well as the other 
factors increase with IV estimation. What is interesting is that when both instrumented variables are 
incorporated in the regression, the beta coefficient of lncdh reaches the maximum. That is to say, two 
instrumented variables can best overcome the endogenous issue especially the measurement error of 
lncdh. 
Table 7: The Beta Coefficient of Variables 
Variables (4) (6) (7) (8) 
lncdh 0.401
***
 0.491
***
 0.495
***
 0.567
***
 
lng -0.310
***
 -0.333
***
 -0.327
***
 -0.333
***
 
Llnnetpr 0.343
***
 0.380
***
 0.398
***
 0.379
***
 
lnruralp 0.023 -0.105 -0.092 -0.104 
lnCIP 0.124 0.118 0.107 0.118 
lnhip 0.191
**
 0.229
**
 0.203
***
 0.229
***
 
 
Second, in order to further compare the relative importance of various factors on famine, we 
decompose the effect of various variables according to Gary Fields(2003)’s approach as equation (2) 
listed. Let sj(lnY) denote the share of the log-variance of explained variable that is attributable to the 
j’th explanatory factor and let R2(lnY) be the fraction of the log-variance that is explained by all of the 
explanatory factors Z taken together. Then, the log-variance of Y can be decomposed as the following 
equation, of which 
j  is the coefficients effect,  jZ  is a standard deviation effect,  and 
, lnjcor Z Y    is a correlation effect. In other words, the attribution of j’th factor to the 
log-variance of Y depends on three factors: the estimated coefficient, the change of the 
explanatory variable, and correlation coefficient between Z and lnY.  
       2ln cov ,ln ln * * ,ln lnj j j j j js Y Z Y Y Z cor Z Y Y              (2) 
As we can see in table 8, the Gfields’ decomposition shows similar results as beta coefficients. 
In the estimation by OLS as model (4), lncdh contribute 11.13% to the log-variance of death rate, 
and the shares of lng, Llnnetpr, lnhip are 10.16%, 5.97% and 2.99% respectively. It indicates that 
communal dining system does be the most important cause of famine. According to the 
estimation of model (6)-(8), the share of lncdh first decreases to 8.71% and 10.42% then go up to 
16.84%, while the shares of other variables increase slightly. We compute the correlation 
coefficient between lndr and lncdh, the predicted lnchd in the first stage of IV estimation, and 
find that the correlation effect of lncdh does first decrease in model (6)-(7) and then rise in model 
(8). The similar change appears in the standard deviation effect of lncdh on famine. 
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According to the Gfields’ decomposition of famine, we find the total effect of communal dining 
system on death rate exceeds the effect of grain availability decline or excessive grain 
procurement. In model (8), the effect of communal dining system almost covers the aggregate 
effect of grain availability decline and excessive grain procurement. That is to say, the famine 
may not happen if there is no communal dining system though rural China encounters crop 
failure and over-procurement during great leap forward. 
 
Table 8: the Gfields Decomposition of lndr 
Variables (4) (6) (7) (8) 
lncdh 11.13
***
 8.71
***
 10.42
***
 16.84
***
 
lng 10.16
***
 10.92
***
 10.69
***
 10.92
***
 
LlnLnetpr 5.97
***
 6.64
***
 6.93
***
 6.64
***
 
lnruralp 0.26 -1.16 -1.02 -1.15 
lnCIP 1.54 1.58 1.33 1.58 
lnhip 2.99
**
 3.65
**
 3.16
**
 3.65
**
 
residual  67.95 75.31 66.65 66.48 
 
Table 9: the statistics of lndr and lncdh 
Model Variable lndr(correlation coefficients) Std. Dev. 
(4) lncdh 0.277 0.504 
(6) lncdh
^
 0.177 0.357 
(7) lncdh
^
 0.208 0.366 
(8) lncdh
^
 0.296 0.413 
 
Ⅳ.Conclusion: The Importance of Exit Rights from the CDHs 
 
We aim to emphasize in this paper that after the communes had been established in 1958, Chinese 
peasants lost not only the right to exit from the commune, but also the right to exit from CDHs. 
While the deprivation of the right to exit from the commune led to the nationwide food shortage 
for over twenty years, it is mainly the deprivation of and the restoration of the right to exit CDHs 
led to the sudden break-out and the abrupt end of the most unprecedented famine in human history. 
People’s communes promoted militarization of organizations, regimentation of actions, and 
collectivization of livelihoods, while CDHs made compulsive collectivization of grain rations 
under the pressure from the State, and finally destroyed the family, the last stronghold of 
individual freedom. Chinese peasants were driven onto the road to serfdom and forced to bear the 
fatal consequences of the state’s catching-up strategy and its goal of rushing to communism. 
We revisit the causes of the great famine for two compelling reasons. First, we believe that 
finding the truth of this tragic famine on the occasion of its fifty-five anniversary is the best way to 
memorize the tens of millions of the victims. They were tricked to join the dining halls by the 
promise of unlimited food supply to only find out that the initial feasts offered by the CDHs 
actually set the stage for turning them into ghosts of hunger on an unprecedented scale. Second, 
we believe that the lesson on the importance of exit right drawn from this tragedy is directly 
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relevant for resolving the soaring “Three Agrarian Issues” in China.
12
 If China can respect 
farmers’ free will by allowing them to exit from the current system of compulsive collective land 
ownership, many of the conflicts between rural and urban areas today will disappear, just as the 
GLF ended abruptly when the peasants regained the right to exit from the compulsory dining halls. 
                                                        
12 “Three Agrarian Issues or San Nong problems” refer to the problem of peasants’ income, rural reconstruction, 
and agricultural production in China.  
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